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Chevron Deference In Tax Administration: Can
Businesses Confidently Rely On Guidance
Promulgated By Treasury In The Wake Of The Tax
Cuts And Jobs Act?

GABRIELLE MURPHY* ©
Introduction

In Mayo Foundation for Medical Education & Research v. United States,1 the
Supreme Court held that judges interpreting regulations promulgated by the Treasury
Department should apply the standard of deference established in Chevron U.S.A.
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.2 Chevron deference is applied when
courts hear challenges to regulations issued by other federal agencies, such as the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and prior to Mayo it was unclear if this
standard also applied in tax administration cases, or if tax cases warranted greater
scrutiny.3 Despite Mayo’s holding that Chevron deference applies to all areas of
administrative law evenly, the Supreme Court’s current trend is a narrowing of
Chevron’s application,4 and an overall curtailing of deference to federal agencies.5
The resulting uncertainty surrounding Chevron translates into uncertainty over how
much reliance can be placed on regulations issued by agencies, such as those
promulgated by the Treasury Department pursuant to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act

© Gabrielle Murphy, 2021.
* Gabrielle Murphy is a J.D. Candidate, 2022, at the University of Maryland, Francis King Carey School
of Law. The author would like to thank the editors and staff on the Journal of Business & Technology Law for
their feedback and support throughout the writing process. The author would also like to thank her family and
friends, especially Michelle Murphy and E.J. Murphy, for their continued love, support, and encouragement,
without which this paper would not be possible.
1.
562 U.S. 44, 56-57 (2011).
2.
467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
3.
Michael W. McConnell, Kavanaugh And The “Chevron Doctrine, SLS BLOGS (Aug. 2, 2018),
https://law.stanford.edu/2018/08/02/kavanaugh-and-the-chevron-doctrine/; Steve R. Johnson, The Rise and Fall
of Chevron in Tax: From the Early Days to King and Beyond, PEPP. L. REV. 14, 21-23 (2015).
4.
Kent Barnett, Christina L. Boyd, & Christopher J. Walker, Judge Kavanaugh, Chevron Deference, and
the Supreme Court, THE REGUL. REV. (Sept. 3, 2018), https://www.theregreview.org/2018/09/03/barnett-boydwalker-kavanaugh-chevron-deference-supreme-court/.
5.
See infra Section III.
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(TCJA) of 2017.6 This expansive tax legislation left open many questions for
businesses and tax professionals regarding definitions, calculations, and other
implementation concerns.7 The Treasury Department attempted to answer these
questions and concerns with over 1,000 pages of regulations and sub-regulatory
guidance.8 The question now is how much deference will courts afford this regulatory
guidance?9 Due to the ambiguities and gaps left in TCJA and taxpayers’ need for
answers, courts will likely be deferential to this Treasury guidance, despite the
general trend away from deference.10 It is unclear however, if Chevron deference
will be the precise standard used to uphold the regulations and sub-regulatory
guidance, or if a less deferential standard will be created in TCJA’s wake.
Courts should maintain the current standards of deference in the tax
administration arena, as this will foster a sense of certainty for businesses and tax
professionals, and will support uniformity in interpretation and application of the
law.11 This comment traces the case law that developed the various standards of
deference, including Chevron,12 as well as the history of the application of these
standards specifically in tax administration.13 This comment then explores how
deference is likely to be, and should be, applied to regulations and sub-regulatory
guidance that followed the enactment of TCJA.14 Specifically addressed herein are
Treasury Regulation § 1.199A15 and Revenue Procedure 2019-11,16 both published
to clarify the 26 U.S.C. § 199A deduction for qualified business income of
passthrough entities,17 using Maryland’s small business economy to exemplify the
important role of these agency rules.18

6.
Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (to be codified in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.); see infra Section IV.
7.
Alexandra Minkovich et al., TCJA – So Many Questions, So Little Time, THE TAX ADVISER (Dec. 3,
2018), https://taxexecutive.org/tcja-so-many-questions-so-little-time/.
8.
Garrett Watson, Two Years After Passage, Treasury Regulations for the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Surpass
1,000 Pages, TAX FOUND. (2019), https://taxfoundation.org/treasury-regulations-for-the-tcja/.
9.
Shannon Meraw, The Supreme Court Curtails but Retains Agency Rule Deference – How Much Will it
Matter?, THE BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 24, 2019), https://www.brookings.edu/research/the-supreme-courtcurtails-but-retains-agency-rule-deference-how-much-will-it-matter/; Alex Guillen & Paul Demko, How the New
Supreme Court Could Stymie a Biden Presidency, POLITICO (Sept. 25, 2020, 6:16 PM), https://www.politico.com
/news/2020/09/25/supreme-court-regulations-biden-421934.
10. See infra Section III, IV.
11. See infra Section IV.
12. See infra Section I.
13. See infra Section II.
14. See infra Section IV.
15. 26 C.F.R. § 1.199A-1 (2019); 26 C.F.R. § 1.199A-3 (2020); see infra Section IV.B.
16. Rev. Proc. 2019-11, 2019-09 I.R.B. 742; see infra Section IV.C.
17. See infra Section IV.A.
18. See infra Section IV.
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I. The Development of Judicial Deference

Deference refers to the concept that courts will be respectful of decisions and rules
created by federal agencies developing and implementing regulatory guidance, and
will not be overly scrutinous if these regulations and rules are challenged in court. 19
Chevron deference, the primary standard discussed herein, often arises in challenges
to regulations produced by agencies that have gone through the notice and comment
rulemaking process.20 Such regulations are often representations of how agencies
interpret the statutes governing them.21 While deference does not mean that courts
will blindly follow decisions of federal agencies, “courts may treat an agency’s
interpretation as binding so long as it is reasonable — even if another interpretation
may also be reasonable, or even more reasonable.”22 There are three primary
standards of deference a court will grant, depending on the type of guidance and the
context with which it was issued: Chevron,23 Skidmore,24 and Auer.25
A. Chevron Deference
Chevron deference provides the most deferential standard of the three and in the
modern judicial context, generally applies in all cases involving an agency regulation
that courts may consider,, including Treasury regulations.26 Chevron “applies . . .
where Congress delegated authority to the agency to make rules carrying the force
of law, and where the interpretation is made pursuant to that authority – that is, by
notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication.”27 Chevron deference,
established in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,28 will

19. Deference
(administrative
state),
BALLOTPEDIA,
https://ballotpedia.org
/Deference_(administrative_state) (las visited Feb. 12, 2021).
20. Steven Katz, Supreme Court Rewrites the Rules for Judicial Deference to Agency Interpretations,
CONSTANGY, BROOKS, SMITH & PROPHETE LLP (July 2, 2019), https://www.constangy.com/newsroomnewsletters-870; Notice and Comment, JUSTIA, https://www.justia.com/administrative-law/rulemaking-writingagency-regulations/notice-and-comment/ (last updated Apr. 2018) (explaining the notice and comment
rulemaking procedure, which government agencies use when developing regulations and other rules. During this
process, agencies (1) “publish notice of a proposed rule in the Federal Register,” (2) collect comments, data, and
arguments from the public, and (3) consider and respond to these comments).
21. Valerie C. Brannon & Jared P. Cole, Chevron Deference: A Primer, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (Sept. 19,
2017), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R44954.pdf.
22. Andrew R. Roberson & Timothy S. Shuman, Deference Principles: Tax Litigation’s Next Battleground,
MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY, https://www.mwe.com/insights/deference-principles-tax-litigations-nextbattleground/ (last visited Oct. 23, 2020).
23. Developed in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
24. Developed in Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944).
25. Developed in Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461 (1997).
26. Roberson & Shuman, supra note 22.
27. Katz, supra note 20.
28. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
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generally be applied when the congressional statute that the regulation in question is
addressing is “ambiguous” and the applicable agency interpretation is “based on a
permissible construction of the statute.” 29 In this case, “a court will apply the
agency’s interpretation, [even if another interpretation is] possibly even more
reasonable.”30
Courts apply a two-step inquiry to determine if Chevron deference is
appropriate.31 At step one, the court will ask whether the statute being addressed by
the regulation in question has plain meaning and whether the department or agency
acted consistently with that meaning in promulgating the subsequent regulation.32 If
the court determines that the statute in question was, in fact, ambiguous, then under
step two, the court will ask whether the agency’s interpretation was reasonable, and
not arbitrary or capricious. 33
The Chevron case, which developed this two-step inquiry, involved a challenge
by environmental groups to the EPA’s interpretation of the word “source” in the
Clean Air Act of 1963.34 In regulations governing permit requirements for pollutantemitting factories,35 companies planning to build or install any major “source” of air
pollutants were required to first go through a review process.36 The relevant statute37
did not precisely define what constituted a “source” of air pollutants, so the EPA
initially developed a definition that covered essentially any significant change or
addition to a plant or factory.38 In 1981, the EPA changed this definition to a more
flexible one that could encompass a plant or factory in its entirety.39 This new
definition favored factories, allowing them to avoid the “new-source review” process
entirely if, when increasing their plant’s emissions through building or modifying,
they simultaneously modified other parts of their plant to reduce emissions so that
the overall change in the plant’s emissions was zero.40 The Court upheld the EPA’s
new definition and formulated the crucial two step inquiry, now known as the
Chevron standard of deference.41
29.

Id. at 843.
Roberson & Shuman, supra note 22.
31. Thomas W. Merrill & Kristin E. Hickman, Chevron’s Domain, 89 GEO. L. J. 833, 834 (2001).
32. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
33. Id. at 843.
34. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1963).
35. Chevron cites the regulation as 40 C.F.R. § 51.18(j)(1) (1983), but the current regulation is 40 C.F.R. §
51.165(a)(3)(ii)(j) (2011).
36. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 849-51.
37. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 (1963).
38. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 858-59.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. “First . . . is the question whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue. If the
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to
30.
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Under the first step, the Court agreed that the statute did not speak to the precise
issue, namely the appropriate definition of “source.”42 In determining the
reasonableness under step two, the court noted that the EPA’s interpretation was
consistent with one of the principal goals of the statute – bridging environmental
concerns with economic growth.43 There were also policy reasons underlying the
Court’s decision to defer to the EPA 44 given its expertise and “greater institutional
competence . . .as compared to courts.”45
B. Skidmore Deference
While Chevron typically applies to more formal agency promulgations, like
regulations, Skidmore deference, a less deferential standard, “has traditionally been
applied to . . . forms of published guidance such as . . . revenue rulings [,]
procedures, notices and announcements.”46 Skidmore deference, developed in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co.,47 considers whether an agency’s “interpretation is
thoroughly considered, well-reasoned and consistent with prior and subsequent
[agency] positions,” through a multi-factor assessment.48 These factors, although not
explicitly outlined in the case itself, include: 49 (i) contemporaneousness,50 (ii) long-

the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress. If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly
addressed the precise question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the statute, as
would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation. Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous
with respect to the specific issue, the question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a
permissible construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842-43.
42. Id. at 860-61.
43. Id. at 865-66.
44. Id. at 864-65.
45. Brannon & Cole, supra note 21 at 3.
46. Roberson & Shuman, supra note 22.
47. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
48. Roberson & Shuman, supra note 22; Skidmore, 323 U.S. at 140.
49. Kristin E. Hickman & Matthew D. Krueger, In Search of the Modern Skidmore Standard, 107 COLUM.
L. REV. 1235, 1236-37 (2007).
50. Contemporaneousness assesses temporal proximity of the interpretation’s promulgation to the statute’s
enactment. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 49, at 1288. “A contemporaneous interpretation may trigger
deference because the agency’s proximity to the statute’s enactment suggests that the interpretation benefited
from special insight into Congress’s wishes.” Id.
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standing duration,51 (iii) consistency,52 (iv) reliance,53 (v) complexity of the issue,54
(vi) presence of rulemaking authority, 55 (vii) need for agency action to implement
the statute,56 and (viii) congressional ratification. 57 In Skidmore, a case involving the
rulings and interpretations of an Administrator within the Department of Labor,58 the
Court held that while courts do not have to defer to an agency’s statutory
interpretation for questions of fact, the agency’s interpretation of the statute should
be taken into consideration because through the agency’s pursuit of its duties, it has
accumulated considerable experience through its work.59

51. Long-standing duration looks at how long the agency interpretation in question has been in effect. Id.
Such “interpretations may trigger deference because, in theory, Congress has acquiesced, especially where it has
reenacted the statutory provision after the agency’s interpretation was made public.” Id.
52. Consistency assess whether an agency interpretation is consistent with other rules and decisions the
agency has made with respect to the same or similar legal issues, or is consistent with other Congressional
enactments. Id. at 1286-87. “Generally, courts value consistency because it protects parties’ reliance interests,
promoted the rule of law by ensuring similarly situated parties are treated, and guards against capricious or illintentioned agency action.” Id.
53. Reliance assesses whether or not there has been significant “public or private reliance on [the] agency
rules or guidances” promulgated. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Lauren E. Bear, The Continuum of Deference:
Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdaan, 96 GEO L. J. 1083,
1092 (2007-08).
54. Complexity of the issue assess the value of agency expertise that Congress or the Judiciary may lack in
a given area of law. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 49 at 1249.
55. Presence of rule-making authority assess whether there was a specific grant by Congress authorizing
the agency to generate rules on the issue in question, or if the agency is operating under a general delegation of
authority to an agency to generate rules. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 49, at 1300.
56. Need for agency action to implement the statute assesses how crucial the agency interpretation in
question is in order to carry out the relevant statute. Elizabeth V. Foote, Statutory Interpretation or Public
Administration: How Chevron Misconceives the Function of Agencies and Why it Matters, 59 ADMIN. L. REV.
673, 681 (2007).
57. Congressional ratification assesses whether Congress has later incorporated the agency’s interpretation
in subsequent legislation. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 49, at 1288.
58. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138-39 (1944). This case was brought pursuant to the Fair
Labor Standards Act by firemen working at a packing plant who were required to periodically stay overnight and
on-call in order to respond to fire alarms, but without overtime pay for the time spent not responding to fires. Id.
at 135-36. The specific question was whether courts could consider agency guidance, such as an interpretive
bulletin by the U.S. Department of Labor's Wage and Hour Division that read the Fair Labor Standards Act
flexibly, so that if employees had significant downtime while on-call, it was permissible to not count the hours
as overtime pay, with which the trial court agreed. Id. Although the Supreme Court here agreed that courts may
look to agency guidance, it ultimately reversed, finding it to be a “restricted” view that “waiting time may not be
work.” Id. at 140.
59. Id. at 137.

338

Journal of Business & Technology Law

Murphy (Do Not Delete)

8/10/2021 10:01 PM

GABRIELLE MURPHY
C. Auer Deference
Lastly is Auer deference, established in Auer v. Robbins,60 which is a standard of
deference applied in cases where an agency is interpreting its own ambiguous
regulation.61 Under this standard,
“[i]f certain conditions62 are met, the [agency’s] interpretation will be
afforded controlling deference based on the theory that the agency is the
best party to interpret its own regulations” [and] “so long as the
necessary requirements are satisfied, a court will accept the agency’s
interpretation even if it believes another interpretation is also
reasonable.”63
II. Deference in the Tax Administration Arena

Initial post-Chevron cases involving court interpretations of Treasury regulations
applied a less deferential standard than Chevron, because it was believed that a
Chevron standard might inhibit a taxpayer’s abilities to effectively challenge
regulations.64 This was the case until Mayo Foundation for Medical Education &

60. 519 U.S. 452 (1997). This case was brought pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act by police officers
alleging that they were entitled to overtime pay, to which the Board of Police Commissioners argued that the
officer was considered exempt from the Act. Id. at 455. Pursuant to one Secretary of Labor regulation, an
employee could be exempt from the Act, and therefore not entitled to overtime pay, if a certain amount of their
pay was on a “salary basis.” Id. A later Secretary of Labor interpretation of this regulation carved out an exception
to the salary basis rule for reductions in pay based on quality of work, meaning employees whose pay is adjusted
for disciplinary purposes could still qualify as salary basis employees and therefore be excluded from receiving
overtime pay. Id. at 456. The issue was how much weight the second rule interpreting the first regulation should
be afforded and the Supreme Court here agreed that courts should look favorably to agency interpretations of
their own regulations, and affirmed the denial of overtime pay for the offices as they were considered salary basis
employees under the Act. Id. at 463-64.
61. Christopher J. Walker, What Kisor Means for the Future of Auer Deference: The New Five-Step Kisor
Deference Doctrine, YALE J. ON REG. (2019), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/what-kisor-means-for-the-future-ofauer-deference-the-new-five-step-kisor-deference-doctrine/.
62. In Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400 (2019), Justice Elena Kagan “reframe[ed]” the test to use in an
application of Auer deference. Walker, supra note 61. First, “[t]he regulation must be ‘genuinely ambiguous’
after applying all ‘traditional tools’ of interpretation.” Id. Second, “the agency’s interpretation of the ambiguous
provision must be ‘reasonable.’” Id. Third, “[i]f the agency regulatory interpretation passes steps one and two,
the reviewing court must then engage in ‘an independent inquiry into whether the character and context of the
agency interpretation entitles it to controlling weight.’” Id. Under this step, “[t]he agency’s regulatory
interpretation ‘must be the agency’s ‘authoritative’ or ‘official position,’ rather than any more ad hoc statement
not reflecting the agency’s views.” Id. Lastly, “[t]he ‘agency’s interpretation must in some way implicate its
substantive expertise.’” Id.
63. Roberson & Shuman, supra note 22.
64. Steve R. Johnson et al., The Upsides and Downsides of Ending Chevron Deference, 154 TAX NOTES
1287, 1287 (Mar. 6, 2017), https://ir.law.fsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1594&context=articles.
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Research v. United States65 established that Chevron was the appropriate standard of
deference to apply in tax administration cases.66
A. Regulations and Sub-regulatory Guidance Promulgated by the Treasury
Department
Section 7805 of the Internal Revenue Code establishes the statutory authority for
the Secretary of Treasury to “prescribe all needful rules and regulations for the
enforcement of [the tax code].”67 The Secretary does this through regulatory and subregulatory guidance, all with varying degrees of authority. Primarily used, and with
the most weight, are regulations.68 Sub-regulatory guidance includes revenue
rulings,69 revenue procedures,70 private letter rulings,71 and technical advice
memoranda.72
B. Tax Cases Applying Deference
Immediately following Chevron, which was decided in 1984, it was often unclear
if tax cases should be granted Chevron deference, or a lesser degree of deference than
other administrative areas, which translates into greater judicial scrutiny.73 This was

65. 562 U.S. 44, 56-57 (2011).
66. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011).
67. 26 U.S.C. § 7805 (2018).
68. The Treasury Department issues regulations “to address issues that arise with respect to existing Internal
Revenue Code sections. Regulations interpret and give directions on complying with the law.” Regulations are
developed through formal notice and comment rulemaking to generate public input through comments and
hearings. Understanding IRS Guidance – A Brief Primer, IRS (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom
/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer; There are general regulations issued pursuant to the general authority
of 26 U.S.C. 7805(a) as well as specific regulations issued pursuant to a specific statutory authority in certain
sections of the Code. Islame Hosny, Interpretations by Treasury and the IRS: Authoritative Weight, Judicial
Deference, and the Separation of Powers, 72 RUTGERS U. L. REV. 281, 302 (2020).
69. Revenue rulings discuss “how the law is applied to a specific set of facts.” Understanding IRS Guidance
– A Brief Primer, IRS (Nov. 6, 2019), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/understanding-irs-guidance-a-brief-primer.
70. Revenue Procedures are “official statement[s] of a procedure that affects the rights or duties of taxpayers
or other members of the public under the Internal Revenue Code, related statutes, tax treaties and regulations and
that should be a matter of public knowledge” often pertaining to technical guidance relating to the filing of taxes.
Id.
71. Private letter rulings are “written statement[s] issued to taxpayer[s] . . . interpret[ing] and appl[ying] tax
laws to the taxpayer’s specific set of facts.” Id.
72. Technical Advice Memorandum are responses to “technical or procedural questions that develop during
a [tax] proceeding[ involving an] examination of a taxpayer’s return, a consideration of a taxpayer’s claim for a
refund or credit, or any other matter involving a specific taxpayer.” Id.
73. See Jeffrey N. Starkey & Thomas A. Cullinan, Is the IRS Always Right? Judicial Deference to Treasury
Regulations and Other IRS Positions, 14 J. TAX PRAC. & PROC. 31, 31 (2012); Merrill & Hickman, supra note
31 at 835; Nathaniel Cushman, The Impact of Illegal Tax Guidance: Notice 2008-83, 62 TAX LAW. 867, 882
(2009); Johnson, supra note 3.
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due to “tax exceptionalism,” or a belief that “tax is special and should be treated
differently from other areas of administrative law.”74 It was thought that the
application of a Chevron standard of deference would unfairly inhibit taxpayers’
abilities to challenge tax regulations given that Chevron “is often thought of as a proagency rule.”75 Mayo Clinic, however, ultimately established that Chevron was the
appropriate standard in tax administration.76
In some early tax cases, courts instead applied a standard of deference grounded
in National Muffler Dealers Association v. United States,77 pre-dating Chevron, and
holding that “[i]n determining whether a particular regulation carries out a
congressional mandate in a proper manner, [the court] look[s] to see whether the
regulation harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin, and its
purpose.”78 In National Muffler, a company challenged the denial of a tax
exemption, but the Court upheld this denial when the company could not establish
that the IRS’s interpretation of the law failed to reasonably implement Congress’
mandate.79 The interpretation in question involved what qualified as a “business
league” for the purposes of a business league exemption, which the Treasury
Department chose to define broadly.80 The Court’s analysis in this case called for a
flexible, multifactor inquiry, similar to that of Skidmore, to determine whether an
interpretive regulation “harmonizes with the plain language of the statute, its origin
and its purpose.”81 A court applying the National Muffler standard examines the age
of the regulation, whether the regulation was issued contemporaneously with the
underlying statute, the reliance placed on the regulation by third parties, whether the
IRS has consistently interpreted the regulation, and the degree of scrutiny that the
regulation was given by Congress.82
One example of a case applying the National Muffler standard is Cottage Savings
Association. v. Commissioner.83 In Cottage Savings, the Court held that the exchange
of different participation interests in home mortgages by a savings and loan

74. Kristin Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN.
L. REV. 1537, 1540 (2006).
75. Johnson et al., supra note 64 at 1287.
76. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011).
77. 440 U.S. 472 (1979).
78. Id. at 477.
79. Id. at 488-89.
80. Id. at 480.
81. Id. at 477.
82. Id.; Matthew H. Friedman, Reviving National Muffler: Analyzing The Effect Of Mayo Foundation on
Judicial Deference as Applied To General Authority Tax Guidance, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 115, 121 (2012); David
J. Shakow, Pass the Mayo: The Supreme Court Says Goodbye to National Muffler, MARTINDALE (Jan. 18, 2011),
https://www.martindale.com/litigation-law/article_Chamberlain-Hrdlicka-White-Williams_1224698.htm.
83. 499 U.S. 554, 560-61 (1991).
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association was a “disposition of property” under 26 U.S.C § 1001(a).84 The Court
came to this conclusion by relying on Regulation §1.1001-1,85 which the court found
reliable given it’s reasonableness, as dictated by National Muffler.86 This
reasonableness was evidenced by the Congress’ explicit delegation of authority87 as
well as the consistency of the regulation’s language.88
However, there began to be disagreement among the courts as to which standard
applied: Chevron or National Muffler.89 This tension was evidenced in cases such as
Swallows Holding Ltd. v. Commissioner,90 where the “Third Circuit reversed the Tax
Court and upheld the requirement of the regulations under [§] 88291 that a foreign
corporation file a tax return within a prescribed deadline in order to be entitled to
deductions and credits related to its U.S. business income (the “timely filing
requirement”).”92 While the Tax Court applied National Muffler, the Third Circuit
disagreed and instead applied Chevron, thus reaching a different outcome by
employing greater deference to the Treasury Department and its regulation.93
Whether tax cases should receive the Chevron treatment afforded to other areas
of administrative law, or should receive more scrutiny as under National Muffler,
was finally determined in the 2011 case Mayo Foundation for Medical Education &
Research v. United States, which held that Chevron was the appropriate standard.94
In Mayo Clinic, the Treasury Department adopted rules that medical residents did
not qualify as “students” exempt from payroll taxes as these students often worked
more than 40 hours a week performing substantial tasks, which the Mayo Clinic
challenged, because although their residents worked 50-80 hours a week, their
educational experiences were also a crucial component of the residency program. 95
In its opinion, the Supreme Court concluded that: (1) Chevron deference, rather
than the National Muffler standard, should apply and (2) under a Chevron analysis,

84.

Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 559-60.
26 C.F.R. 1.1001-1 (1990) (stating that “the gain or loss realized from the conversion of property into
cash, or from the exchange of property for other property differing materially either in kind or in extent, is treated
as income or as loss sustained”).
86. Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 560-61.
87. See 26 U.S.C § 7805(a) (establishing the statutory authority for the Secretary of Treasury to “prescribe
all needful rules and regulations for the enforcement of [the tax code].”
88. Cottage Savings, 499 U.S. at 560-62.
89. Shakow, supra note 82.
90. 126 T.C. 96 (2006), rev’d, 515 F.32d 162 (3d Cir. 2008).
91. 26 U.S.C. § 882 (2017).
92. Aditi Banerjee et al., Court of Appeals Upholds Timely Filing Requirement for Foreign Corporations,
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL, LLP (Feb. 27, 2008), https://www.sullcrom.com/siteFiles/Publications
/SC_Publication_Court_of_Appeals_Upholds_Timely_Filing_Requirement_for_Foreign_Corporations.pdf.
93. Swallows Holding, 515 F.32d at 164.
94. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Rsch. v. United States, 562 U.S. 44, 55 (2011).
95. Id. at 48.
85.
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the regulation96 is valid because Congress did not precisely speak to this issue and
the regulation’s interpretation of the statute was reasonable.97 The Court also found
Chevron deference appropriate given that the regulation had been promulgated
following notice and comment rulemaking procedures and had been issued pursuant
to an explicit authorization by Congress granted to the Treasury Department to
prescribe necessary rules.98 Overall, this case is key because it held that tax cases
were to be granted the same level of deference as other areas of the law. 99
III. Recent Trends in Deference

Despite the confirmation that Chevron applies to all areas of administrative law,
including tax, there is currently a general shift away from judicial deference100
through a narrowing of its application, primarily stemming from an ideological shift
in the Court.101 The Court has “curtailed but retain[ed]” deference102 and while “[t]he
Supreme Court is unlikely to overrule Chevron outright, . . . [the current trend]
suggests that the Court may begin to apply a less robust form of Chevron
deference.”103 State courts are also shifting away from deference, 104 and the House
of Representatives has proposed at least one bill to curtail Chevron, although none
have made it very far.105
One example of the Court narrowing its application of Chevron deference, is King
v. Burwell,106 a 2015 case in which “the Court considered whether states participating
in a federal health care exchange were eligible for tax credits under the [ACA].”107
Although the Court ultimately upheld the regulation that allowed for ACA tax

96.

26 C.F.R. § 31.3121(b)(10)-2(d)(3)(iii) (2004).
Mayo Found., 562 U.S. at 60.
98. Id. at 57-58.
99. Id. at 56.
100. Joshua Matz, The Imminent Demise of Chevron Deference?, TAKE CARE (June 21, 2018),
https://takecareblog.com/blog/the-imminent-demise-of-chevron-deference.
101. Phillip Dane Warren, The Impact of Weakening Chevron Deference on Environmental Deregulation,
118 COLUM. L. REV. 62, 66-68 (2018).
102. Meraw, supra note 9.
103. Warren, supra note 100, at 63; Evan Bernick, Notice & Comment: Judge Amy Coney Barrett on
Statutory Interpretation: Textualism, Precedent, Judicial Restraint, and the Future of Chevron, YALE J. ON REG.
(2018),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/judge-amy-coney-barrett-on-statutory-interpretation-textualismprecedent-judicial-restraint-and-the-future-of-chevron-by-evan-bernick/.
104. David M. Ortner, The End of Deference: The States That Have Rejected Deference, YALE J. ON REG.
(2020), https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/the-end-of-deference-the-states-that-have-rejected-deference-by-danielm-ortner/.
105. Separation of Powers Restoration, H.R. 76, 115th Cong. (2017) (requiring de novo review of challenges
statutory and regulatory provisions).
106. 576 U.S. 473 (2015).
107. Brannon & Cole, supra note 21, at 12.
97.
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subsidies, the Court declined to apply Chevron deference due to “economic and
political” implications.108 The Court concluded that these factors rendered Chevron
entirely inapplicable, and asserted the judicial branch’s role in interpreting the law.109
Overall, this case embodies the current trend of moving away from Chevron.110
There are several arguments in favor of the continued application of judicial
deference as well as valid arguments against its continued use.111 Beginning with the
arguments favoring deference; first, employing deferential judicial standards
respects agency expertise,112 which can produce better policy outcomes.113 Deference
also recognizes the constitutional allowance for congressional delegations of
authority to agencies,114 as it has become a relatively common practice for Congress
to leave the technicalities related to implanting laws to agencies, which have
policymakers and experts better equipped to manage these issues.115 In tax
specifically, deference to the Treasury Department means that courts are more likely
to treat similarly situated taxpayers the same, a hallmark of a fair tax system,
fostering uniformity in application of the law.116 In a business context, taxpayers may

108. King, 576 U.S. at 485-86 (internal citation omitted). (“When analyzing an agency’s interpretation of a
statute, [courts] often apply the two-step framework announced in Chevron[,] . . . [in which] we ask whether the
statute is ambiguous and, if so, whether the agency’s interpretation is reasonable. This approach “is premised on
the theory that a statute’s ambiguity constitutes an implicit delegation from Congress to the agency to fill in the
statutory gaps. In extraordinary cases, however, there may be reason to hesitate before concluding that Congress
has intended such an implicit delegation.” This is one of those cases. The tax credits are among the Act’s key
reforms, involving billions of dollars in spending each year and affecting the price of health insurance for millions
of people. Whether those credits are available on Federal Exchanges is thus a question of deep “economic and
political significance[.]” . . . It is especially unlikely that Congress would have delegated this decision to the IRS,
which has no expertise in crafting health insurance policy of this sort.
109. Id.
110. Catherine M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2359, 2412 (2018).
111. Justin S. Daniel, Scrutinizing Deference to Administrative Agencies, THE REG. REV. (Nov. 27, 2017),
https://www.theregreview.org/2017/11/27/daniel-scrutinizing-deference/ (This article discusses some of the core
arguments for and against. judicial deference. Some arguments for the continued use of judicial deference
includes the existence of congressional intent to outsource some rulemaking to agencies, which oftentimes have
expertise in their respective field. The primary arguments against judicial deference is that this principle violates
the separation of powers and leads to a “‘dangerous consolidation of law-making and law-execution powers’ in
federal agencies.”).
112. Aditya Bamzai, The Origins of Judicial Deference to Executive Interpretation, 126 YALE L. J. 908, 976
(2017); Jonathan R. Siegel, The Constitutional Case for Chevron Deference, 71 VAND. L. REV. 937, 961 n.148
(2018).
113. Matz, supra note 100.
114. Henry Paul Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6 (1983).
115. Justin S. Daniel, Scrutinizing Deference to Administrative Agencies, THE REGUL. REV. (Nov. 27, 2017),
https://www.theregreview.org/2017/11/27/daniel-scrutinizing-deference/.
116. Kristin E. Oglesby, Granting Chevron Deference to IRS Revenue Rulings: The “Charitable” Thing to
Do, 78 LA. L. REV. 632, 669-70 (2018).
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often desire certainty in the laws, regulations, and sub-regulatory guidance affecting
them, and Chevron deference contributes to a greater level of certainty.117
There are, however, also arguments in opposition to deference, and these
arguments are increasingly important as the Court continues to bend towards a
conservative majority.118 The arguments against deference are generally grounded in
concerns regarding the separation of powers.119 One argument, for example, is “that
judicial deference to ambiguous agency statutory interpretations contradicts the
Constitution’s vestment of judicial power in Article III courts, which requires the
Judiciary, rather than the Executive, to ‘say what the law is.’”120 Another separation
of powers argument is that executive agencies are formulating policy under the guise
of regulating to fill statutory gaps, which is, in fact, a legislative job that has been
vested to Congress.121 Lastly, there are arguments that Chevron is not applied
uniformly and where one judge may find ambiguity in a statute and reasonableness
in an agency interpretation, another may not.122 As courts continue to embrace these
arguments and chip away at Chevron’s application, relying on agency regulations
becomes precarious.

117. Id. at 663 (arguing in favor of granting Chevron deference to regulations and revenue rulings given
agency expertise as well as taxpayer certainty and consistency in the law).
118. Daniel, supra note 115 (providing some of the key arguments against deference); Bernick, supra note
103 (noting the increasingly conservative Court’s shift away from deference).
119. The primary arguments for cutting back on deference are rooted in separation of powers arguments,
based on roles created by the first three articles of the Constitution. There are Article I concerns that it is the job
of Congress to make laws and through deference they are allowing administrative agencies take this role on.
Arguments Against Judicial Deference: Deference Violates Separation of Powers Principles, BALLOTPEDIA
https://ballotpedia.org
/Arguments_against_judicial_deference:_Deference_violates_separation_of_powers_principles (last visited
Dec. 20, 2020). There are Article II concerns that deference creates a large administrative state which presents
concerns that they are reaching too far outside the bounds of Article II. Id. Additionally, Article III concerns arise
because it is the Court’s duty to say what the law is, whereas in deference cases it is the administrative agencies
saying what the law is. Id.
120. Brannon & Cole, supra note 21, at 22 (citing Campbell v. Michigan, 135 S. Ct. 2357, 2712 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803))).
121. Id. at 5. See also Stephen Wemiel, SCOTUS for law students: Non-delegation doctrine returns after
long hiatus, SCOTUSBLOG (Dec. 4, 2014, 8:00 PM), https://www.scotusblog.com/2014/12/scotus-for-lawstudents-non-delegation-doctrine-returns-after-long-hiatus/ (discussing how opponents to Chevron deference
tend to prefer the non-delegation doctrine, which is the idea that Congress can’t give their powers away to nonelected parties).
122. Brannon & Cole, supra note 21.

Journal of Business & Technology Law

345

Murphy (DO NOT DELETE)

8/10/2021 10:01 PM

Chevron Deference In Tax Administration
IV. Deference in the Wake of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: What Does This
Mean for Business and Tax Planning?

Changes to the Court’s application of deference can have significant implications
for businesses due to reliance placed on Treasury guidance in tax-planning.123 One
concern is that if businesses rely on Treasury regulations that are later challenged
and tossed out in court, that this has the potential to be costly and time-consuming;
for example, businesses may develop accounting methods specifically to comply
with an initial regulation, only to need to re-develop their methods after the initial
regulation is tossed out in court.124
Treasury guidance played a particularly important role in the wake of the Tax Cuts
and Jobs Act (TCJA),125 the major tax reform passed in 2017, 126 as many gaps were
left in the legislation. 127 TCJA made some major changes to the U.S. tax code and
was “the largest tax overhaul since 1986.”128 Key features of this law included: a
lowered corporate tax rate from 35% to 21%; implementation of a 20% qualified
business income deduction for businesses other than corporations; a decrease in most
personal tax rates; and an increase of the standard deduction for personal income
taxes.”129

123. James Gray et al., Treasury and IRS Release Proposed 199A Regulations on the 20% Pass-Through
Deduction, SQUIRE PATTON BOGGS (2018), https://www.squirepattonboggs.com/-/media/files/insights
/publications/2018/08/treasury_irs_release_proposed_199a_regulations
/treasury_irs_release_proposed_199a_regulations.pdf (“Regulations in the areas where [TCJA] was most unclear
and the areas in which taxpayers and tax advisors were pressing Treasury for guidance so they could proceed
with tax planning or estimating tax liability.”).
124. Scott A. Hodge, The Compliance Costs of IRS Regulations, TAX FOUND. (June 15, 2016),
https://taxfoundation.org/compliance-costs-irs-regulations/ (noting that “[t]he growing complexity of the U.S.
tax code has led to large compliance costs for . . . businesses” and “[t]he cost of complying with U.S. business
income taxes accounts” costs about “$147 billion”).
125. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (to be codified in scattered sections
of 26 U.S.C.).
126. How did the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Change Business Taxes, TAX POL’Y CTR.
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-did-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-change-business-taxes
(last
visited Oct. 26, 2020).
127. Minkovich et al., supra note 7.
128. William G. Gale, A Fixable Mistake: The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, THE BROOKINGS INST. (Sept. 25,
2019), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2019/09/25/a-fixable-mistake-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/.
129. How did the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Change Business Taxes, TAX POL’Y CTR.
https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/how-did-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-change-business-taxes
(last
visited Oct. 26, 2020); Overview of the TCJA Effects Tracker, UNC TAX CENTER, https://tax.unc.edu/index.php
/what-do-we-know-about-the-effects-of-the-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act/overview-of-the-tcja-effects-tracker/
(last
visited March 20, 2021). See also Gale, supra note 128 (noting that the CBO expects this law to “increase in the
primary deficit at $1.3 trillion over 10 years and the overall debt increase (counting interest payments) at $1.9
trillion” and we are already seeing a decrease in annual tax revenue).
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This statute was sped through Congress though, and many details were left out;
details that left business owners and tax professionals with questions regarding
definitions, calculations, and other implementation concerns regarding the new
law.130 Specific examples where clarity in the law was lacking include: the “valuation
rules for the personal use of employer-provided vehicles,”131 how sexual harassment
settlements should be deducted,132 and when the changes to deductions for net
operating losses were to become effective.133 The initial legislation enacted also
included at least one technical error.134
These questions were largely left to the Treasury Department and the IRS to
address, and Treasury issued over 1,000 pages of regulations in the year following
TCJA’s passage.135 As the courts scale back on deference though, the question arises
as to how much reliance can be placed on this regulatory and sub-regulatory
guidance.136 This question has implications for businesses across the country, who
must work to comply with new complexity in an already complex taxation
landscape.137
Exploring specific regulations and sub-regulatory guidance issued pursuant to
TCJA might allow for a better understanding of the trends in deference within the
area of tax administration, and how courts may approach potential challenges to
these. The rest of this section evaluates one regulation 138 and one revenue ruling139
130. Minkovich et al., supra note 7.
131. Watson, supra note 8.
132. Lawmakers Explain TCJA Errors & Request IRS Guidance Reflect Congressional Intent Pending
Corrections, THOMAS REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2018), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/lawmakers-explain-tcjaerrors-request-irs-guidance-reflect-congressional-intent-pending-corrections/.
133. TCJA Glitches and the Extender: Uncertainty Looms Over Some Federal Income Tax Provisions,
BARNES WENDLING CPAS (Apr. 12, 2019), https://www.barneswendling.com/tcja-glitches-and-the-extendersuncertainty-looms-over-some-federal-income-tax-provisions/ (explaining that the new law “limits the [net
operating losses (NOLs)] deduction to 80 percent of taxable income” but while “[t]he statutory text states that
changes to carrybacks and carryforwards apply to NOLs arising in taxable years ending after Dec. 31, 2017 —
. . . the Conference Report says they apply to NOLs arising in taxable years beginning after Dec. 31, 2017.”).
134. David McGuire, Why Uncertainty Still Remains With Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, FORBES (Jan. 28, 2019,
8:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesfinancecouncil/2019/01/28/why-uncertainty-still-remains-withtax-cuts-and-jobs-act/?sh=1f8705ae9590 (The primary drafting error concerned Qualified Improvement Property
(QIP). “QIP was supposed to be assigned a depreciable life of 15 years; if that had been done, QIP would be
eligible for 100% bonus depreciation under code section 168(k). Unfortunately, during the final negotiations over
the TCJA, an error was made. During the drafting, the portion of the law providing a 15-year life for QIP was
eliminated by mistake. Under the final version of the law, QIP is assigned a life of 39 years and is not bonus
eligible.”).
135. Watson, supra note 8.
136. Minkovich et al., supra note 7.
137. Small Business Introduction to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: Part 1, NFIB RSCH. CTR. (May 2018),
https://www.nfib.com/assets/TCJA-Survey.pdf.
138. 26 C.F.R. § 1.199A-1 (2019).
139. Rev. Proc. 2019-11, 2019-09 I.R.B. 742.
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that attempted to clarify the implementation of TCJA’s § 199A deduction for
qualified business income.140 Included is an assessment of how courts would be
likely to, and should, address challenges to these, as well as the impacts of these
judicial concerns on small businesses in Maryland.141
A. Section 199A Deduction for Qualified Business Income
One TCJA provision with a wide scope in terms of its impact on businesses,
especially small and local businesses, is § 199A, which allows for passthrough
businesses142 (partnerships, sole proprietorships, and S-corporations) to deduct up to
20% of qualified business income (QBI) and 20% of qualified real estate investment
trust (REIT) dividends.143 QBI is essentially net profit excluding capital gains or
losses, dividends, interest income, and income earned outside the United States.144
REITs are entities established for the purpose of “own[ing] or finance[ing] incomeproducing real estate”145 and are “a preferred vehicle for investment in income
producing real estate portfolios”146 given the steady stream of income produced.147
In the QBI calculation, there are also limits on the amount of the deduction, as
well as what types of business are eligible.148 For example, if a taxpayer exceeds a
certain income level, then the deduction is limited in that it “cannot exceed the greater
of 50% of the owner’s share of W-2 wages for a business, or 25% of those wages

140. 26 U.S.C. § 199A (2018).
141. See infra text accompanying notes 178-84 and 221-22.
142. Passthrough businesses are those that “are not subject to the corporate income tax or any other entitylevel tax. Instead, their owners or members include their allocated shares of profits in taxable income under the
individual income tax.” Tax Policy Center Briefing Book: Key Elements of the U.S. Tax System, TAX POL’Y CTR.
(May 2020), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/what-are-pass-through-businesses.
143. Toni Nitti, Understanding the New Sec. 199A Business Income Deduction, THE TAX ADVISOR (Apr. 1,
2018),
https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2018/apr/understanding-sec-199A-business-incomededuction.html#fn_22; Qualified Business Income Deduction, IRS https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/qualifiedbusiness-income-deduction (last updated Oct. 6, 2020).
144. Andrea Coombes & Tina Orem, What is the Qualified Business Income Deduction (QBI) & How Can I
Get it?, NERD WALLET (Sept. 24, 2020), https://www.nerdwallet.com/blog/taxes/pass-through-income-taxdeduction/.
145. REITs: Real Estate Working for You, NAREIT https://www.reit.com (last visited Dec. 14, 2020).
146. Elizabeth L. McGinley & Steven J. Lorch, Utilizing REITs for Midstream Assets, THE NAT’L LAW REV.
(Jan. 15, 2020), https://www.natlawreview.com/article/utilizing-reits-midstream-assets.
147. A Short Lesson on REIT Taxation, INTELLIGENT INCOME BY SIMPLY SAFE DIVIDENDS
https://www.simplysafedividends.com/intelligent-income/posts/18-a-short-lesson-on-reit-taxation (last visited
Dec. 14, 2020) (noting that “[l]egally, a REIT must pay out at least 90% of its taxable income as dividends”
which generally creates a steady stream of income for its shareholders).
148. See Nitti, supra note 144 (discussing how for taxpayers with taxable income greater than $157,5000,
“[t]he deduction is limited to the greater of (1) 50% of the W-2 wages with respect to the trade or business, or
(2) the sum of 25% of the W-2 wages, plus 2.5% of the unadjusted basis immediately after acquisition of all
qualified property.”).
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plus 2.5% of the owner’s share of the unadjusted basis of qualified property used in
the business.”149 In addition, there is a reduction in the amount an owner can claim
in the deduction if the business is a “specified service trade or business.”150
The TCJA statute itself left out details regarding calculations and other
implementation concerns of § 199A, leaving accountants, tax professionals, and
business owners with questions.151 For example, it was unclear whether § 199A
applied to rental properties, how businessowners with multiple entities should
calculate net QBI, how fiscal year businesses should be treated, what exactly
qualified as a service business,152 and “if the [§] 199A deduction would apply to
[regulated investment companies] (RICs)153 invested in REITs.”154 These questions
raised even more concern in light of the penalty associated with understating income
under 199A.155
B. Treasury Regulation §1.199A
Given these questions, and others, the Treasury Department promulgated
guidance pertaining to numerous TCJA provisions, including § 199A,156 following a

149. Gary Guenther, The Section 199A Deduction: How it Works and Illustrative Examples, CONG. RSCH.
SERV. (June 10, 2020), https://www.everycrsreport.com/files/2020-06-10_R46402_ce8364a4e8e395af8b6e2fe
708f68530389d8aa4.pdf.
150. Jamie Hopkins, Understanding the 199A Deduction After the New IRS Final Regulations, FORBES (Feb.
13, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamiehopkins/2019/02/13/understanding-the-199a-deduction-after-thenew-irs-final-regulations/?sh=1156e5ca5770 (noting that “a specified service trade or business” is “any trade or
business involving the performance of services in the fields of health, law, accounting, actuarial science,
performing arts, consulting, athletics, financial services, brokerage services, or any trade or business where the
principal asset of such trade or business is the reputation or skill of 1 or more of its employees”).
151. Shu-Yi Oei & Leigh Osofsky, Legislation and Comment: The Making of the § 199A Regulations, 69
EMORY L. J. 209, 227-28 (2019).
152. Nitti, supra note 143.
153. Understanding Regulated Investment Companies: Tax-Exempt Municipal Bonds within RICs, INVESCO
https://www.invesco.com/pdf/U-RIC-FLY-1-E.pdf (last visited Dec. 17, 2020) (“A[n] RIC is an association
taxable as a corporation for federal income tax purposes. Many unit trusts and most mutual funds are organized
as RICs for tax purposes. If a[n] RIC adheres to very specific requirements regarding portfolio diversification,
types of assets, distribution minimums and year-end reporting, it avoids taxation at the corporate level. Investors
in RICs own units of the trust, not the underlying securities.”).
154. Andreana Shengelya & Robert A. Velotta, Sec. 199A Dividends Paid by a RIC with Interest in REITs
and PTPs, THE TAX ADVISER (Aug. 1, 2019), https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2019/aug/sec-199adividends-ric-interest-reits-ptps.html.
155. Tracey Fielman, Impact of Sec. 199A in Computing Substantial-Understatement Penalties, THE TAX
ADVISER (May 1, 2019), https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2019/may/sec-199a-computing-substantialunderstatement-penalties.html.
156. Final Sec. 199A Qualified Business Income Deduction Regs: Qualified Business Income, THOMAS
REUTERS TAX & ACCT. (Jan. 23, 2019), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/final-sec-199a-qualified-businessincome-deduction-regs-qualified-business-income/.
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notice-and-comment rulemaking process.157 Regulation §1.199A was issued to
clarify a few key points of § 199A, most notably, (1) the definition of capital gains,
(2) whether rental real estate activities qualify as a trade or business, (3) how to
calculate this deduction in instances where a taxpayer is engaged in multiple trades
or businesses, and (4) whether regulated investment companies (RICs) that receive
dividends from real estate investment trusts (REITs) may take the § 199A
deduction.158
First, pursuant to TCJA, capital gains or losses159 were not to be taken into account
when computing QBI, which begged the question as to how capital gain and loss
were being defined in this context. Regulation § 1.199A,160 specifies that net capital
gain is the sum of: (1) the excess of net long-term capital gain over net short-term
capital loss for the tax year,161 plus (2) qualified dividend income.162
“Under the final regulations, taxpayers must first net their Section 1231
gains and losses in order to determine whether the amounts will be
treated as a capital gain or ordinary loss. If the net result is an excess
gain, the character of the gain is capital and is excluded from QBI. If the
net result is an excess loss, the character of the loss is ordinary and
reduces QBI.”163
When following Regulation § 1.199A, “[t]axpayers . . . should note that the amount
they treat as net capital gain for [§] 1 purposes may not be the same as the amount
they treat as net capital gain for [§]199A purposes.”164

157. Rules for Cooperatives and Their Patrons, 84 Fed. Reg. 28668 (proposed June 19, 2019) (to be codified
at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1).
158. 26 CFR § 1.199A-1 (2019).
159. Definition of ‘Capital Gain/Loss,’ THE ECON. TIMES, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition
/capital-gainloss (“Capital gain is the profit one earns on the sale of an asset like stocks, bonds or real estate. It
results in capital gain when the selling price of an asset exceeds its purchase price. It is the difference between
the selling price (higher) and cost price (lower) of the asset. Capital loss arises when the cost price is higher than
the selling price.”) (last visited Dec. 15, 2020).
160. 26 CFR § 1.199A-1 (2019).
161. 26 U.S.C. § 1222(11).
162. 26 U.S.C. § 1(h)(11)(B).
163. Jeffrey Bilsky et al., Final Regulation of Section 199A, BDO USA LLP (Jan. 2019),
https://www.bdo.com/getattachment/2754f12a-2225-40ff-bda8-d7bfdddd66fc/attachment.aspx?BDOK-TaxReform_Final-regulations-regarding-determination-Sec-199A.pdf.
164. Final Section 199A Regulations and Other Guidance Provide Welcome Guidance, Leave Questions
Unanswered and Raise New Issues, ERNST & YOUNG LLP (Jan. 24, 2019), https://taxnews.ey.com/news/20190218-final-section-199a-regulations-and-other-guidance-provide-welcome-guidance-leave-questionsunanswered-and-raise-new-issues.
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Second, regarding concerns over whether rental real estate property qualified as a
trade or business,165 Regulation § 1.199A, put forth five factors to consider whether
such enterprises could qualify.166 These factors include:
“(i) the type of rented property (commercial real property versus
residential property), (ii) the number of properties rented, (iii) the
owner’s or the owner’s agents day-to-day involvement, (iv) the types
and significance of any ancillary services provided under the lease,
and (v) the terms of the lease (for example, a net lease versus a
traditional lease and a short-term lease versus a long-term
lease).”167
The regulation itself do not explain how these factors are to be applied, but it is
“surmise[d] that the IRS is more likely to agree that a rental real estate activity is a
trade or business if the taxpayer is leasing a number of commercial properties and
providing daily, on-the-ground services to lessees under traditional, long-term
leases.”168 The regulation also established a safe harbor provision, whereby “a rental
real estate enterprise may be treated as a trade or business” for purposes of [§]199A
if at least 250 hours of services are performed each taxable year with respect to the
enterprise.169
Third was the issue of “whether the [QBI] deduction would need to be determined
separately for each trade or business, or if the IRS would allow taxpayers to aggregate
different trades or businesses into one basket.”170 “An individual can have an
ownership interest in more than one pass-thr[ough] business” and one passthrough entity can conduct “[m]ultiple and often different trades or businesses.”171
While “[t]he general rule under [§]199A is that each business ‘stands on its own,’”

165. The Treasury regulations noted that many individuals who submitted comments during the notice and
comment rulemaking process regarded concerns over this issue. Qualified Business Income Deduction, 84 Fed.
Reg. 2952 (proposed Feb. 8, 2019) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1). “Commenters noted inconsistency in the
case law in determining whether a taxpayer rental real estate is engaged in a trade or business” and several
believed this category of revenue should qualify as the QBI deduction. Id.
166. 26 CFR § 1.199A-1 (2019).
167. Lou Vlahos, Rental Real Estate and the Sec. 199A Deduction: Round Two, FARRELL FRITZ (Jan. 29,
2019),
https://www.taxlawforchb.com/2019/01/rental-real-estate-and-the-sec-199a-deduction-round-two
/#_ednref12.
168. Elizabeth Yablonicky & Guinevere Moore, A Primer on Deducting Losses from Real Estate Activities
for “the Rest of Us”, THE AM. BAR ASS’N (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/taxation
/publications/abataxtimes_home/19feb/19feb-pp-yablonicky-moore-a-primer-on-deducting-losses/.
169. Id.
170. Anthony Delvalle & Shmuli Fromovitz, Aggregation & Netting Under Section 199A, MARKS PANETH
ACCT. & ADVISORS (Feb. 18, 2019), https://www.markspaneth.com/insights/category/articles/aggregationnetting-under-section-199a.
171. Erik Doerring, Section 199A – The Decision to Aggregate, TAX LAW INSIHTS: A BURR & FORMAN BLOG
(July 2, 2019), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/section-199a-the-decision-to-aggregate-90427/.
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through Regulation §1.199A, the Treasury Department permitted “an individual
to ‘aggregate’ or combine multiple trades or businesses for purposes of applying
the W-2 wages and depreciable property limits for the deduction.”172 Income from
service businesses, however, cannot be aggregated with other businesses, and the
method chosen must be applied consistently from year to year. 173 Aggregating can
“result[] in combining the QBI, W-2 wages and qualified property of the
aggregated separated businesses. This can be very helpful, for example, if some
businesses have little wages or qualified property. . . and other businesses have a
relative abundance of W-2 wages or qualified property.” 174
Lastly, in response to the question of whether the QBI deduction applies to
RICs invested in REITs, § 199A regulations indicate that “the payment by RICs of
dividends that certain shareholders may [be] include[d] as qualified REIT dividends
under Sec. 199A(b)(1)(B).” 175 This was in contrast to initial understandings of the
law, which found that RICs did not qualify, given their status as C-corporations, as
opposed to the passthrough businesses intended to benefit from the § 199A
deduction.176
These regulations were influential to many U.S. businesses, especially small
businesses, engaged in tax planning following the passage of the act, and will
continue to be influential for tax planning so long as these TCJA provisions remain
in effect. Looking at Maryland, for example, there are over 594,124 small businesses,
comprising over 99% of Maryland businesses.177 That is a significant number of
172. Id.
173. Kate Abdoo, Lee Gay & John Kerrigan, Determining What is a Separate Trade or Business for Sec.
199A Purposes, THE TAX ADVISER (July 1, 2019), https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2019/jul/determiningseparate-trade-business-sec-199A.html.
174. Steve R. Akers, Section 199A – Qualified Business Income Deduction Including Highlights of Final
and Newly Proposed Regulations, BESSMER TR. (Feb. 2019), https://www.bessemertrust.com/sites/default/files
/2019-02/Section%20199A%20Final%20Regulations%20Summary_02_15_19.pdf.
175. Eric Mauner, REIT dividends and PTP income under Prop. Regs. Sec. 1.199-3(d), THE TAX ADVISER
(May 1, 2019), https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2019/may/reit-dividends-ptp-income.html (discussing the
regulations found at 26 C.F.R. § 1.199A-3 (2019)). See also Martin T. Hamilton et al., “Passthrough Deduction”
Regulations for RICs Finalized with No Major Changes, THE PROSKAUER TAX BLOG (Jun. 29, 2020),
https://www.proskauertaxtalks.com/2020/06/passthrough-deduction-regulations-for-rics-finalized-with-nomajor-changes/ (“A ‘Section 199A dividend’ is eligible for the passthrough deduction to the extent it is derived
from the aggregate amount of qualified REIT dividends includible in the RIC’s taxable income for the taxable
year less expenses properly allocable to the qualified REIT dividends. Generally, most dividends made by a REIT
in the ordinary course of business are qualified REIT dividends.”).
176. Mauner, supra note 175.
177. See Maryland Small Business Profile, 2019, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF ADVOC. (2019),
https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/23142650/2019-Small-Business-Profiles-MD.pdf
(While being a small business does not equate being a pass-through entity, there is a correlation between the two,
and statistics on pass-through entities in Maryland could not be located while statstics on small businesses were
available.). See also Mark P. Keightley & Joseph S. Hughes, Pass-Throughs, Corporations, and Small
Businesses: A Look at Firm Size, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (March 15, 2018), https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports
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businesses that might be impacted by how Treasury regulations interpret § 199A.
These businesses now have clarity on the capital gains calculation for § 199A,178 and
a better understanding of the rules surrounding aggregation.179
Furthermore, in 2019, 54,764 of Maryland’s small businesses fell into the
category of “Real Estate and Rental and Leasing.”180 This is a significant number of
rental and leasing businesses that would need to know if their income from these
activities qualifies for the QBI deduction, and how to structure their operations so
that they may take such deduction.181 Lastly, Maryland is a popular state for REITs
with “[a]bout two-thirds of the nation’s publicly traded REITs are organized in
Maryland.”182 This is a significant number of participants left wondering if dividends
passing through to RICs might qualify for the deduction. 183 While these companies
now have regulations addressing these concerns, the question turns to how these
regulations will be treated in court.
Despite the trend away from judicial deference to federal agency rulemaking, the
Court would still be likely to, and should, be deferential to the Treasury Department
under the Chevron standard in the event that the regulations clarifying § 199A are
challenged. As a brief reminder, the Chevron inquiry asks (1) whether the statute has
plain meaning, and in the case that a statute is, in fact, ambiguous, (2) whether the
agency interpretation was reasonable or whether it was arbitrary or capricious.184
When applying step one, regarding the ambiguity of the relevant statute,185 “[t]he
judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent”186 but
“a court cannot waive the ambiguity flag just because it found the regulation
impenetrable on first read.”187 It remains difficult to say that TCJA was anything

/R44086.html (explaining how “[i]n tax policy discussions it is not uncommon for the terms pass-through and
small business to be interchanged” and after an assessment of 2015 U.S. Census data, “the majority of [passthrough] firms were [in fact,] small” businesses).
178. Final Section 199A Regulations and Other Guidance Provide Welcome Guidance, Leave Questions
Unanswered and Raise New Issues, ERNST & YOUNG LLP (Jan. 24, 2019), https://taxnews.ey.com/news/20190218-final-section-199a-regulations-and-other-guidance-provide-welcome-guidance-leave-questionsunanswered-and-raise-new-issues.
179. Akers, supra note 174.
180. Maryland Small Business Profile, 2019, U.S. SMALL BUS. ADMIN. OFFICE OF ADVOC. (2019),
https://cdn.advocacy.sba.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/04/23142650/2019-Small-Business-Profiles-MD.pdf.
181. Yablonicky & Moore, supra note 168.
182. Heather Harlan, REITs Find a Comfortable Home in Md., BALT. BUS. J. (Mar. 27, 2020),
https://www.bizjournals.com/baltimore/stories/2000/03/27/story4.html.
183. Shengelya & Velotta, supra note 154.
184. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984).
185. Congress must first confer authority on an agency to act. Brannon & Cole, supra note 21 at 1.
186. Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843, n.9.
187. Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S.Ct. 2400, 2415 (2019).
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other than ambiguous and full of gaps that needed to be filled.188 Following the Act’s
passage, questions and concerns immediately arose regarding issues surrounding the
lack of understanding as to how portions of the law would be defined, computed, and
implemented.189 Technical errors were also uncovered in TCJA.190 Additionally,
Treasury’s authority to issue regulations is well-recognized pursuant to the
previously discussed 26 U.S.C. § 7805, and it seems clear that Congress clearly
intended to Treasury to delegate authority to implement TCJA, in particular.191 At
step one, TCJA, the statute in question, does appear to be ambiguous, particularly
with regards to § 199A given the specific questions just discussed that were
immediately raised by businesses and tax professionals.192
How courts rule at this first step is highly influential to the outcome at the second
step,193 but there is some variation in how the second step can be applied.194 At the
first step, one judge may find ambiguity in a statute while another may “employ[] a
wide array of interpretive tools to find statutory clarity.”195 Moving to the second
step, though, under a narrow reading of Chevron, courts will concede that a statute
is vague, but will scrutinize the regulation with a heavier hand in search of a hint of
arbitrariness or capriciousness; whereas under a broader reading of Chevron, courts
will take the vagueness of a statute as an indication that Congress intended for the
agency to fill the gaps and be more likely to find “reasonableness.”196 Courts will
then be deferential to a “permissible construction” of the agency’s regulation, or
interpretation of the statute.197 The current trend among the Court is to apply the
former: the narrow application of Chevron.198 That said, even under a narrow
application, courts would still be likely to uphold the Treasury’s regulations and subregulatory guidance interpreting § 199A, given that Treasury relied on notice and
188. Minkovich et al., supra note 7.
189. Nitti, supra note 143.
190. See McGuire, supra note 134 (discussing the primary drafting error in the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which
concerned Qualified Improvement Property (QIP)).
191. Lawmakers Explain TCJA Errors & Request IRS Guidance Reflect Congressional Intent Pending
Corrections, THOMSON REUTERS (Aug. 20, 2018), https://tax.thomsonreuters.com/news/lawmakers-explain-tcjaerrors-request-irs-guidance-reflect-congressional-intent-pending-corrections/.
192. Minkovich et al., supra note 7.
193. Catherin M. Sharkey, Cutting in on the Chevron Two-Step, 86 FORDHAM L. REV. 2365, 2384 (2018).
194. See Johnson et al., supra note 64, at 1287 (“[T]he Chevron step two inquiry has become more rigorous.
It used to be thought that step two was largely an empty formality, that an agency position would be invalidated
at step one or not at all. More recently, courts have been holding against agencies at step two, as either principal
or alternative grounds for decision[.]”).
195. Shelby L. Hancock, 2018 Supreme Court Cases Suggest Narrow View of Agency Deference Under
Chevron, MANKO GOLD KATCHER FOX LLP (Jan. 14, 2019), https://www.mankogold.com/publicationsChevron-Natural-Resources-Defense-Council-Deference.html; Johnson et al., supra note 64, at 1288.
196. Brannon & Cole, supra note 21, at 18-20.
197. Id.
198. See supra Section III.
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comment proceedings199 and on definitions created by Congress elsewhere in the
code200 in developing regulations that were addressing pressing questions.201
Furthermore, courts should continue to exercise deference to Treasury regulations
that are not arbitrary or capricious because Treasury employs policymakers with
expertise of the complex tax code needed to make necessary regulations, and because
this will foster uniformity among cases involving challenges to regulations and
guidance.202 In terms of TCJA specifically, Congress intended to defer to Treasury
on these matters with all the technical questions that were left unanswered,203 which
creates stability in the law by allowing businesses to feel comfortable relying on these
regulations in their operations.204 There were numerous regulations promulgated
following TCJA,205 which should be granted some degree of deference, but should
ideally be assessed under the Chevron standard of deference.206

199. See Leigh Osofsky & Shu-Yi Oei, Legislation and Comment: The Making of the § 199A Regulations,
69 EMORY L. J. 209, 242-55 (2019) (tracing the history of the notice and comment process for the regulations
addressing § 199A).
200. Joseph Most, Section 199A: Treasury Regulations Answer Many Questions, BERDON LLP (Feb. 5,
2019), https://www.berdonllp.com/section-199a-treasury-regulations-answer-many-questions/ (“The Final [§
199A] Regulations adopt the commonly used Section 162(a) definition of “trade or business” found
throughout the Internal Revenue Code and interpreted extensively in case law. ).
201. Minkovich et al., supra note 7. But see Christopher P. Murphy et al., Challenging Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act Regulations and IRS Guidance, SKADDEN’S 2020 INSIGHTS (Jan. 21, 2020), https://www.skadden.com
/insights/publications/2020/01/2020-insights/challenging-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act (highlighting that “[s]ome of the
guidance issued by the IRS and Treasury appears to be inconsistent with or goes beyond the scope of controlling
statutes[,]” meaning that not all guidance promulgated by Treasury pursuant to TCJA would survive a judicial
challenge).
202. Daniel T. Shedd & Todd Garvey, Chevron Deference: Court Treatment of Agency Interpretation of
Ambiguous Statutes, CONG. RSCH. SERV. (Aug. 28, 2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R43203.pdf.
203. Howard Gleckman, How Will Treasury Fill In the Blanks Of The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act?, TAX POL’Y
CTR. (Apr. 17, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/how-will-treasury-fill-blanks-tax-cuts-and-jobsact.
204. Oglesby, supra note 116, at 669-70.
205. Some examples include: Additional Rules Regarding Base Erosion and Anti-Abuse Tax, 84 Fed. Reg.
67046 (proposed Dec. 6, 2019) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 1); Determination of the Maximum Value of a
Vehicle for Use With the Fleet-Average and Vehicle Cents-per-Mile Valuation Rules, 84 Fed. Reg. 44258
(proposed Aug. 23, 2019) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1); Advance Payments for Goods and Long-Term
Contracts, 84 Fed. Reg. 33691 (proposed July 15, 2019) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1 & 602).
206. Leandra Lederman, The Fight Over “Fighting Regs” and Judicial Deference in Tax Litigation, 92 B.
U. L. REV. 643, 698 (2012) (arguing that courts should maintain Chevron deference – or Skidmore, where
appropriate – but with the added caveat that “courts could find a regulation arbitrary or capricious under Chevron,
. . . if it prejudices the taxpayer and its timing appears to reflect opportunism rather than careful application of
the agency’s expertise”).
But see Grant Marshall, Hold the Mayo: Why Strong Deference to Treasury Regulations Might Not be
Healthy, 13 TRANSACTIONS: THE TENN. J. OF BUS. L. 343, 356 (2012) (arguing that experts within the IRS are
influenced by their own biases and reliance on heuristics, they may not achieve optimal policy outcomes through
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C. Treasury Revenue Procedure 2019-11
The future of deference is also uncertain with regards to other categories of subregulatory guidance that the Treasury Department promulgates, such as revenue
rulings, revenue procedures, private letter rulings, and technical advice
memoranda.207 The standard applied to these types of agency output, Skidmore, is
less deferential than that of Chevron, applied to regulations.208 While the Court has
indicated “that guidance not deserving [of] Chevron deference may still be entitled
to Skidmore deference . . . depend[ing] on the ‘thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and [other] factors which give it power to persuade,” courts may
take opportunities to curtail deference access of the board.209
Regardless of how courts may decide to defer to sub-regulatory guidance under
Skidmore or Auer, business and tax professionals should be cautious of relying on
these categories of guidance, given the Treasury Department’s stated commitment to
not requesting deference regarding sub-regulatory guidance.210 Shortly after TCJA
was enacted and after Treasury had issued some key regulations, Treasury issued a
policy statement that they would not seek deference with regards to sub-regulatory
guidance:
When proper limits are observed, subregulatory guidance can provide
taxpayers the certainty required to make informed decisions about their
tax obligations. Such guidance cannot and should not, however, be used
to modify existing legislative rules or create new legislative rules. The
Treasury Department and the IRS will adhere to these limits and will not
argue that subregulatory guidance has the force and effect of law. In
litigation before the U.S. Tax Court, as a matter of policy, the IRS will not
seek judicial deference under Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452 (1997) or
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467

regulations and sub-regulatory guidance, and reducing the amount of judicial deference granted to them will help
counter-act such biases and heuristics).
207. See supra notes 69-72.
208. See supra Section II.
209. Andrew R. Roberson & Jeffrey M. Glassman, Deference to IRS Interpretations and the Challenges of
Auer Deference, THE FED. LAW. (Mar. 2016), https://taxcontroversy360.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03
/Deference.pdf (citing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
210. Policy Statement on the Tax Regulatory Process by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, THE
TREASURY DEP’T (Mar. 5, 2019), https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/131/Policy-Statement-on-the-TaxRegulatory-Process.pdf; Alistair M. Nevius, Treasury Announces Changes to Tax Regulatory Process, THE TAX
ADVISER
(2019),
https://www.thetaxadviser.com/news/2019/mar/tax-regulatory-process-changes201920765.html.
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U.S. 837 (1984), to interpretations set forth only in subregulatory
guidance. 211
In its statement, the Department asserted a commitment to formal, notice and
comment rule-making, meaning businesses should exercise care in relying on subregulatory guidance.212 It should be noted, however, that Skidmore, the primary
standard for sub-regulatory guidance, was not explicitly mentioned in the policy
statement, whereas Chevron and Auer were, despite the statement’s main point that
Treasury would not seek deference for sub-regulatory guidance.213 Therefore, it is
unclear if the Treasury intended to leave the door open for Skidmore, assumed its
inclusion, or if this was an oversight.
One example of sub-regulatory guidance in the tax administration context
includes revenue procedures, and shifting back to our discussion of § 199A, one
specific revenue procedure involves proper calculations of W-2 wages pursuant to
the statute.214 If a taxpayer finds him or herself eligible for the deduction, “[t]he
wage and property limitation limits the tentative deductible amount for each activity
to the greater of 50% of qualified W-2 wages of the activity or 25% of qualified W2 wages of the activity plus 2.5% of the unadjusted basis immediately after
acquisition (UBIA) of qualified property.”215 Under § 199A, if a taxpayer earns more
than $210,700, or $421,400 if married filing jointly, the deduction may be limited by
W-2 wages.216 Revenue Procedure 2019-11217 provides three ways a taxpayer can
calculate W-2 wages: (1) the unmodified box method,218 (2) the modified box 1

211. Policy Statement on the Tax Regulatory Process by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, supra note
211; Nevius, supra note 211.
212. Policy Statement on the Tax Regulatory Process by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, supra note
211; Carina C. Frederico et al., Insight: Treasury Issues Policy Statement that May Be the Death Knell for ‘Auer’
Deference in Tax Cases and Zombie Notices, BLOOMBERG TAX (2019), https://news.bloombergtax.com/dailytax-report/insight-treasury-issues-policy-statement-that-may-be-the-death-knell-for-auer-deference-in-taxcases-and-zombie-notices.
213. Policy Statement on the Tax Regulatory Process by the U.S. Department of the Treasury, supra note
211.
214. 26 CFR 1.199A-2 (2019).
215. Thomas M. Dalton, ICYMI: Proposed Regulation Clarify the IRC Section 199A Deduction, THE CPA
J. (Jan. 2020), https://www.cpajournal.com/2020/01/30/proposed-regulations-clarify-the-irc-section-199adeduction/.
216. Jin Dong Park & Zhen Zhang, W-2 Wages and Sec. 199A, JOURNAL OF ACCT. (July 1, 2019),
https://www.journalofaccountancy.com/issues/2019/jul/w-2-wages-sec-199a.html.
217. Rev. Proc. 2019-11, 2019-09 I.R.B. 742.
218. Unmodified box method: wages are calculated by taking “the lesser of (1) the total entries in box 1
(wages, tips, and other compensation) of all Forms W-2 . . .filed by the taxpayer with the SSA or (2) the total
entries in box 5 (Medicare wages and tips) of all Forms W-2 filed by the taxpayer with the SSA.” Alistair Nevius,
Guidance Provided on Calculating W-2 wages for Sec. 199A Purposes, THE TAX ADVISER (Apr. 1, 2019),
https://www.thetaxadviser.com/issues/2019/apr/guidance-calculating-w-2-wages-sec-199A-purposes.html.
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method,219 and (3) tracking wages method.220 The primary difference between the
three is “generally with respect to whether elective retirement deferrals to qualified
retirement plans are taken into account.”221
This is important for businesses to keep in mind because “[e]mployers may
benefit from comparing the W-2 wages under all methods in order to determine
which method is most beneficial . . . particularly if the employer provides taxqualified retirement arrangements for its employees or offers other benefits that are
not treated as wages for federal income tax withholding purposes.”222 Furthermore,
in this revenue procedure does not require an employer to use the same method of
calculation from year to year but rather grants a “flexibility [that] may be useful for
employers, particularly if they adopt or change their employee benefit plans.”223
Given the Treasury’s statement that it won’t rely on deference, in addition to the
court’s curtailing of deference, there may be concerns over reliance on this guidance.
Courts, however, should adhere to an application of Skidmore, should the Treasury
Department defend the revenue procedure in court.
A court would be likely to uphold Revenue Procedure 2019-11 under Skidmore.224
Pursuant to the Skidmore deference test, the factors a court will consider include (1)
contemporaneousness, (2) long-standing duration, (3) consistency, (4) reliance, (5)
complexity of issue, (6) presence of rulemaking authority, (7) need for agency action
to implement statute, (8) congressional ratification, and (9) quality of agency
explanation.225 In the present case, Revenue Procedure 2019-11 was issued
contemporaneously as it was promulgated in direct response to TCJA and the need
for clarity, which “suggests that the interpretation benefited from . . . insight into
Congress’s wishes.”226 As businesses begin to formulate accounting methods to
account for W-2 wages for §199A purposes, reliance will likely build. The issue is

219. Modified box 1 method: wages are calculated by “making modifications to the total entries in box 1 of
all Forms W-2 filed by the taxpayer with the SSA by subtracting amounts that are not wages for federal income
tax withholding purposes (such as supplemental unemployment compensation benefits) and adding the total
amounts of various elective deferrals that are reported in box 12.” Id.
220. Tracking wages method: wages are calculated by “track[ing] total wages subject to federal income tax
withholding and elective deferrals reported in box 12.” Id.
221. Guidance Clarifies How to Calculate W-2 Wages for Purposes of Section 199A, DELOITTE TAX@HAND
(May 22, 2019), https://www.taxathand.com/article/11643/United-States/2019/Guidance-clarifies-how-tocalculate-W-2-wages-for-purposes-of-section-199A.
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Roberson & Shuman, supra note 22.
225. See supra notes 50-57.
226. Hickman & Krueger, supra note 49, at 1288.
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arguably one of complexity, given the difficult accounting tax and technicalities.227
Additionally, the Treasury Department is recognized as having the authority to
promulgate necessary regulations and sub-regulatory guidance in order to implement
tax legislation,228 and in this case, there was pressing need for clarity for taxpayers
in order to enforce TCJA.229
Turning back to the impact on small businesses in Maryland, there are costs
associated with adhering to tax rules, and uncertainty in sub-regulatory guidance has
the potential impact of increasing these costs. With Revenue Procedure 2019-11, in
particular, a business may go through the efforts of computing all three W-2 wage
calculations to later find the one ideal for their operations, only to later find the one
they selected for use was challenged in court and set aside as no good, resulting in a
need for a new accounting system. This lends support to the argument that courts
should be deferential to sub-regulatory guidance enacted pursuant to TCJA, even if
the standard is one that is less deferential than Chevron or Skidmore.
V. Conclusion

Overall, despite indications that the Supreme Court is shifting away from
deference,230 courts will still be likely to uphold many of the regulations and subregulatory guidance promulgated pursuant to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017,
such as those relating to the qualified business income deduction of § 199A discussed
here, due to ambiguities in the statute, Congressional intent for Treasury to address
these concerns, and need for swift agency action. 231 Courts should also continue to
apply the deferential standards of Chevron and Skidmore to the Treasury
Department’s regulatory and sub-regulatory guidance as this creates stability in the
law and allows businesses to have a greater sense of certainty in their reliance on
these regulations and sub-regulatory guidance in their operations, as they develop
accounting methods and other tools to comply with the tax law.232

227. C. Eugene Steuerle, The TCJA Will Create More Complexity for Taxpayers than it Claims, THE TAX
POL’Y CTR. (Jan. 5, 2018), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/tcja-will-create-more-complexity-taxpayersit-claims.
228. Tax Research – Federal: About Treasury Regulations, DORRAINE ZIEF LAW LIBRARY (Dec. 6, 2019),
https://legalresearch.usfca.edu/c.php?g=523831&p=3581100.
229. Christopher P. Murphy, Royce L. Tidwell, & Nathan P. Wacker, Challenging Tax Cuts and Jobs Act
Regulations and IRS Guidance, SKADDEN, ARPS, SLATE, MEAGHER & FLOM LLP (Jan. 21, 2020),
https://www.skadden.com/insights/publications/2020/01/2020-insights/challenging-tax-cuts-and-jobs-act.
230. See supra Section III.
231. See supra Section IV.
232. See supra Section IV.
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